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"Weapons like to Lightning"!
US Information Operations and
US Treaty Obligations

Jeffrey H. Smith and Gordon N. Lederman

T

he increasing prevalence of computers in the world economy creates
new opportunities for the US to conduct offensive military operations
and espionage. However, the US is increasingly vulnerable to computer attack,
requiring the United States to defend its military and civilian electronic infrastructure. As a nation committed to the rule oflaw, the United States must remain within the bounds of international law in the conduct of both offensive
and defensive information operations.
This chapter e:ll..1'lores the opportunities and restraints offered by internationallaw for the conduct of US information operations. We both summarize
and critique the 1999 analysis of these issues by the Office of General Counsel, US Department of Defense (DoD), entided "An Assessment ofInternational Legal Issues and Information Operations" (hereinafter DoD/GC
Paper).2 The DoD/GC Paper surveys international legal issues ranging from
the law of war, to obligations under the United Nations Charter, to a host of
treaties signed by the United States. This chapter will explore the impact of
US international obligations concerning outer space, international communications, and other issues on the conduct of information operations. It will not
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address the law of war3 or the UN Charter, 4 as they are addressed elsewhere
in this "Blue Book."5
First, this chapter provides a general overview of the development and conduct ofinformation operations. Second, it briefly outlines the structure ofinternational law, including the existence of treaties and the formation of customary
international law. Third, US obligations under international law regarding the
use ofouter space and the impact ofthese obligations on the conduct ofinformation operations are examined. Fourth, we will explore treaties and international
agreements related to the international communications network and their impact on US information operations. Fifth, a survey of possible treaties and other
US obligations under international law is offered as a checklist for military commanders and officials deciding whether to authorize a particular information operation. The chapter concludes by offering some thoughts on the merits of an
international treaty concerning information operations. In sum, the internationallegal obligations analyzed herein complicate US information operations
but present no insurmountable barriers to them. 6
It must also be understood that any information operation may well be taken
under the extreme pressure of international conflict, without adequate time to
weigh all of the legal and political considerations that ought to be considered.
Consequendy, careful thought must be given to the host of problems raised by
these emerging technologies. Moreover, the rate of change in the information
technology world means that the legal and political questions presented may be
dramatically altered by new technological developments.
In addition, information warfare presents an interplay between domestic and
international law not previously seen. For example, the authority of the United
States to detect, track, and respond to an information operation is driven as
much by the law governing electronic surveillance of US citizens as by internationallaw governing the use of force. Similarly, the questions of what legal authority authorizes an agency to act-and which agency-are very difficult
questions. Although beyond the scope of this chapter, these questions must also
be answered well in advance of an international crisis.
Finally, it may be difficult to determine whether an information operation is a
hostile attack or a criminal act. This ambiguity raises a multitude of questions
about how the US should respond to such an event. Furthermore, a response
from the US may have unintended consequences, as decision-makers may
not be able to predict the collateral damage that may result. An information operation against one nation's infrastructure may have collateral damage, such as
destroying bank records, that is much more severe than was intended. Given the
interconnectivity of the Internet, a US information operation may blowback
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into the United States. Such a possibility raises several questions concerning the
privacy and rights of US citizens.
In sum, information operations present many complex legal and operational
issues. To first address them in the heat ofan information operation is to risk answering them inappropriately.

The Emergence of Information Operations as a Weapon in the Arsenal of
Democracy and as a Threat to Democracy Itself
The benefits ofincreased efficiency and greater speed brought by the infusion
ofcomputer technology-particularly the Internet-into the modem economy
come at the price of increased vulnerability to disruption and economic ruin as
the result ofa computer attack? The United States, as the world's most technologically advanced nation, is best situated to develop mechanisms that import
information technology into weapons systems8 and to exploit other countries'
reliance on information technology. Simultaneously, however, the United
States itselfis vulnerable to economic paralysis resulting from the crippling of
key US information technology systems. Indeed, as the Federal Bureau ofInvestigations' former information technology security director, Jim Settle, has
stated, the United States could be brought to its knees within 90 days by
10 hackers.9 Information warfare could eventually usurp the position ofbiological and chemical weapons as "the poor man's nuclear weapon" because,
like biological and chemical weapons, information warfare does not require
sizeable financial investment but, unlike biological and chemical weapons, is
potentially easier to use-all that is needed for information warfare is a computer and a modem.
As with any concept of sudden importance, the terms and definitions ofinformation warfare have yet to coalesce into an established lexicon. The most succinct
definition of information warfare is offered by Winn Schwartau: "Information
warfare is an electronic conflict in which information is a strategic asset worthy of
conquest or destruction."1o The US military uses the term "information operations," which involves "actions taken to affect adversary information and information systems, while defending one's own information and information systems."l1
The term "information systems" refers to "the entire infrastructure, organization,
personnel, and components that collect, process, store, transmit, display, disseminate, and act on information. "12 "Information operations" thus refers to attacks
against such infrastructure, organization, personnel, etc.
The military also uses the term" computer network attack," defined as "operations to disrupt, deny, degrade, or destroy information resident in computers
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and computer networks or the computers in computer networks themselves."13
Information operations include a whole host of weapons, including Electro
Magnetic Pulse (EMP) and directed energy weapons (such as lasers and highenergy radio frequency guns).
Bureaucratic barriers may have obstructed the conduct of US information
operations during the Gulf War and the Bosnia operations. 14 However, the
United States did conduct information operations in the 1999 NATO air campaign against Serbia. Army General Henry H. Shelton, Chairman of the Joint
ChiefS of Staff, confirmed that the US used information warfare against Serbia
during the Kosovo campaign when he stated that "you can assume that we in
fact employed some of our systems, yes."15 Yet, the DoD's after-action report
on the air war noted that "the conduct of an integrated information operations
campaign was delayed by the lack of both advanced planning and strategic
guidance defining key objectives."16 Indeed, the DoD apparently was concerned about the legalities of full-scale information operations against Serbia, as
well as the untested nature of the information warfare arsenal; as a result, the
information operations were apparently constrained. Also, the relative decentralization of Serbian computer systems limited the potential for success of information operations. US military forces apparently did confuse and disable the
Serbian air defense system using information operations, but these attacks originated with electronic jamming aircraft rather than over computer networks
from ground-based sources. 17
The United States, of course, is a prime target of foreign information operations. Lieutenant General William Donahue, the Air Force's Director of Communications and Information, reportedly stated that, during the Kosovo air
campaign, hackers from Chinese Internet addresses targeted NATO networks
after NATO's accidental bombing of the Chinese Embassy in Belgrade. 18
Other countries also recognize the growing and critical importance ofinformation operations. For example, the Chinese military reportedly recognizes and
hopes to exploit the potential offered by information operations. On November 2, 1999, Major General Chang Chia-Sheng, director of the simulation center under the Chinese Ministry of National Defense, stated at a news conference
that China would be able to launch information warfare against Taiwan by
2005. 19 An article entitled "Bringing Internet Warfare Into the l\Ililitary System
is of Equal Significance with Land, Sea, and Air Power," in Liberation AmI}'
Dail}', the official daily newspaper of the People's Liberation Army's General
Political Department, reportedly stated that it was likely that another Chinese
military branch, a so-called net force, would be needed to conduct information
operations. The article was quoted as saying, "Modem High-Tech Warfare
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cannot win without the net, nor can it be won on the net. In the future, there
must be coordinated land, sea, air, space, electronic and net warfare. . . . "20
Other news reports indicate that China and Taiwan are particularly involved in a
growing arms race regarding information warfare. 21
Information operations are thus growing in importance for military operations. It is likely that the United States will utilize information operations in future warfare and peace-enforcement operations. Thus, military and civilian
decision-makers must understand the opportunities and restraints offered by international obligations on the conduct of such operations.

A Brief Survey of the Process of International Law
Before looking at specific treaties, it is helpful to have an appreciation for
how international obligations arise. Two principles of international law are
that, first, sovereign States are equal and independent actors in the international system, and, second, States assume legal obligations only by actually
agreeing to do so. States may enter into international treaties and agreements
binding the signatory parties. There also exists a body of "customary" internationallaw, composed ofpractices that are so widely followed by the majority of
nations that they are considered obligatory for all. For example, the first satellites
launched by the Soviet Union and the United States were seen as benign, and
nations lacked the technological ability to interfere with satellites; as a result, it
became customary international law that objects in orbit were beyond territorial
claims ofany nation and that outer space was open to all nations. These concepts
were later embodied in international treaties concerning outer space, which will
be discussed later in this chapter. As a side note, the development ofinternational
law concerning outer space contrasts with that concerning aviation, in which
nations produced a highly restrictive legal structure creating the concept of air
space and rendering illegal the entrance of aircraft into another nation's airspace. 22
Countries usually cannot unilaterally withdraw from a treaty unless the treaty
provides for such an action, and treaties can only be modified by the agreement
of the parties. It should be noted that both treaties ratified by the Senate and executive agreements entered into by the President are equally binding on the
United States. Also, many treaties are silent on whether they continue to be in
force in the event of conflict or hostilities between the signatory parties; this is
important for discerning whether the US is bound by a particular treaty's obligations in the event of an outbreak of hostilities and a US desire to conduct information operations. 23
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US Information Operations in Space
International law concerning activities in outer space is critical for information operations because outer space is a vital batdeground for information operations. Space-based systems "perform such functions as communications relay,
image recollection, missile warning, navigation, weather forecasting, and signals
intelligence."24 .As a result, US information operations will be aimed in part
against space-based systems. Such attacks could manifest themselves in attacks
against ground stations, jamming communications links, or attacking the satellites in space themselves. 25 Furthermore, as apparendy occurred during the
Kosovo air campaign, satellites can be used to relay transmissions that are part of
a US information operation against a ground-based target.
Since the first satellite was launched by the Soviet Union in 1957, States
have signed four major multilateral space treaties: (1) the 1967 Outer Space
Treaty;26 (2) the 1968 Rescue and Return Agreement;27 (3) the 1972 Liability
Convention;28 and (4) the 1975 Registration Convention.29 The Moon Agreement of 1979 was not signed by the United States and has in fact only been
signed by eleven, and ratified by nine, countries. 30 Emerging from these four
major space treaties are several principles concerning the use of space: (1)
outer space is free for e]'."ploration and use by all States and cannot be subject
to any claim of sovereignty; (2) activities in space must be done ,vith due regard for the interest of other States; and (3) States that launch objects into
space are liable for any damage they cause . .As the DoD/GC Paper highlights,
the rules on the use of force such as the law of war and the UN Charter are
fully applicable in space. The paper also notes that, while space law contains
the principle of non-interference with other States' space systems, this provision might be inapplicable during wartime if the treaties themselves do not remain in effect during hostilities. 31
Although these treaties stricdy limit the use of space for military purposes,
they do not oudaw all military activities per se. Rather, the Outer Space Treaty
mandates that parties shall not "place in orbit around the Earth any objects carrying nuclear weapons or any other kinds of weapons of mass destruction, install such
weapons on celestial bodies, or station such weapons in outer space in any other
manner" (emphasis added).32 The Outer Space Treaty also prohibits the establishment of military bases and other types of military activities on the moon. 33
The 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty provides that no party may" develop, test or deploy" space-based ABM systems or components. 34 .As the
DoD/GC Paper summarizes, the web ofinternational treaties concerning space
prohibits the stationing, testing, or exploding of nuclear devices in outer space
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and the deployment of a space-based anti-ballistic missile capability. However,
despite the existence of certain limitations, the paper concludes that there is no
legal prohibition on developing and using non-nuclearweapons in space, whether
deployed in orbit or via flight from the earth's surface.35 Seemingly, this conclusion appears to open space to information operations.
Still, the DoD/GC Paper does not explore one possible way in which the
Outer Space Treaty might ban information operations utilizing satellites. While
the Outer Space Treaty prohibits" objects carrying nuclear weapons or any other
kinds of weapons of mass destruction ... or stationing such weapons in outer
space, in any other manner,"36 it is unclear whether information operations fall
into the category of weapons of mass destruction. For example, a computer attack against any national computer system of critical importance (e.g., key banking systems, key medical systems, computer systems controlling dams, oil
refineries, and other critical infrastructure installations) could wreak "mass destruction" in the sense ofwidespread loss oflife and prop erty. 37 To the extent that
a weapon is judged to be a weapon ofmass destruction not because it falls within a
certain category of what is already accepted as a weapon of mass destruction,
namely, chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear, but rather based on the
weapon's effect, information operations could (if used skillfully) exact a fearful
toll on both life and property.38 Ofcourse, even ifcertain information operations
could constitute weapons of mass destruction, it is unclear what constitutes" carrying" or "station[ing]" such weapons on a satellite. If a satellite is used simply to
relay data from a computer in the aggressor country to a computer in the victim
country, it is unclear whether such a relay of information would be considered
"carrying" or "stationing" as defined by the Outer Space Treaty. However, one
could imagine a situation in which a particular program for information warfare is
stored in a satellite's computer, waiting for the proper signal or timing for delivery to a ground-based target. In this case, the Outer Space Treaty could be interpreted as prohibiting the use of satellites for information warfare.
If the erratic development of US policy on anti-satellite weapons is any indication, policy regarding information operations in space may remain unsetded
for many years. For example, in the early 1980s, the Air Force developed an
anti-satellite missile designed to be fired from an F-15 fighter flying at a high altitude. Mter the system was tested in 1985, Congress prohibited the appropriation
of funds for anti-satellite weapons to be tested against an object in orbit, leading
to the termination of the program in 1987. Congressional critics of the
anti-satellite weapons program argued that: (1) outer space should remain free
from warfare; (2) tests in space of anti-satellite weapons created space debris; (3)
testing of anti-satellite weapons might interfere with arms control negotiations;
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and (4) the United States did not necessarily want to encourage other nations to
develop an anti-satellite weapon system given its own heavy reliance on satellites. In contrast, supporters of anti-satellite programs argued that the United
States should have the ability to attack opposing States' satellites and should invest in defending its own satellites.
By the early 1990s, anti-satellite technology had moved away from missiles
and toward lasers. Congress first prohibited and then later allowed the use ofappropriated funds for a test ofa laser against an orbiting satellite. In October 1997,
the US Army tested its MlRACL laser against an aging satellite. While the Army
tried to construe the test as purely defensive in nature (namely to observe the effects of a laser on satellites in order to generate information for protecting satellites), a public uproar followed. President Clinton subsequently used his
then-existing line-item veto authority to strike funds from the fiscal year (FY)
1998 DoD Authorization Act for projects related to an anti-satellite and space
control program. Subsequently, following the Supreme Court's ruling that the
line-item veto was unconstitutional, Congress approved funds for anti-satellite
weapons in the FY 1999 DoD Authorization Act. 39 Accordingly, it is likely that
the increased use of space-based systems as instruments in information warfare
will engender criticism from opponents of anti-satellite weapons systems, who
will argue that the United States should not further militarize space. However,
the assumption in 1999 by US Space Command ofresponsibility for information
operations signals that the military will likely integrate space-based systems into
information operations. 40

International Telecommunications Law and Information Operations
International telecommunications law is a web of bilateral and multilateral
treaties. 41 The 1992 ITU Convention42 is the preeminent treaty in this area,
with over 130 signatories. This convention and others established the International Telecommunications Union (ITU) , a specialized agency of the
United Nations with the authority to formulate telegraph and telephone regulations which become binding legal obligations after formal acceptance by lTU
members.
Article 45 of the ITU Convention states that all radio stations, "whatever
their purpose, must be established and operated in such a manner as not to cause
harmful interference to the radio services or communications ofother Members
or ofother duly authorized operating agencies, which carry on a radio service, and
which operate in accordance with the provisions of the Radio Regulations."43
Annex 2 of the Convention defines harmful interference as "interference which
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endangers the functioning ofa radionavigation service or of other safety services
or seriously degrades, obstructs or repeatedly interrupts a radio communication
service operating in accordance with the Radio Regulations. "44 The DoD / GC
Paper recognizes that jamming or spoofing a radio navigation service would violate this provision. 45 Therefore, the ITU Convention and the entire telecommunications multilateral treaty regime would seem to limit information
operations that involve interference with radio broadcasting.
Still, as the paper notes, Article 48 of the ITU Convention provides an exemption for military operations: "Members retain their entire freedom with regard to military radio installations ofthe Army, Naval, and Air Forces. "46 Article
48 continues, "[n]evertheless, these installations must, so far as possible, observe ... the measures to be taken to prevent harmful interference, and the provisions of the Administrative Regulations concerning the types of emission and
the frequencies to be used, according to the nature of the service performed by
such installations. "47 The DoD / GC Paper also notes that, in July 1994, the Department ofJustice's Office of Legal Counsel relied on Article 48 in deciding
that the United States could broadcast messages to the Haitian people from military aircraft and international air space urging them not to flee Haiti by sea in
hazardous vessels. 48
The ITC also allows signatory States to interfere with international telecommunications in certain circumstances. Article 34 allows members to "stop the
transmission ofany private telegram which may appear dangerous to the security
of the State or contrary to its laws, to public order or to decency, provided that
they immediately notify the office of origin of the stoppage ofany such telegram
or part thereof, except when such notification may appear dangerous to the security of the State. "49 In addition, States may" cut offany other private telecommunications which may appear dangerous to the security ofthe State or contrary
to its laws, to public order or to decency."5o And finally, Article 35 allows members "to suspend the international telecommunications service for an indefinite
time, either generally or only for certain relations and/or for certain kinds of
correspondence, outgoing, incoming or in transit, provided that it immediately
notifies such action to each of the other Members through the medium of the
Secretary-General."51 The ITC provisions do not state whether the treaty applies during armed conflict. However, as the DoD / GC Paper notes, there is precedent that international communications treaties are suspended during armed
conflict. During World War I, for example, the British Navy cut Germany's major submarine cables despite the existence of the 1884 Convention for Protection of Submarine Cables. It should be noted, however, that the United States
may have entered into bilateral communications agreements with particular
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countries that may be relevant depending on the circumstances ofa particular information operation.
The DoD/GC Paper concludes by stating that "International Conununications Law contains no direct and specific prohibition against the conduct of information operations by military forces, even in peace time."52 However, US
information operations may be carried out not only by military forces, but also
by intelligence personnel engaged in covert action or other intelligence-related
activities. Yet, the ITU Convention's Article 48 exemption for military operations does not appear to allow for such interference in teleconununications by
non-military personnel such as intelligence operatives. 53 Also, the international teleconununications treaty regime contains certain notice provisions,
and it is unlikely that the military would wish to publicize its information operations in that way.

AChecklist of Other US Treaty Obligations
In addition to international law governing the use of outer space and teleconununications, various other treaties and international obligations could impact upon, interfere with, and possibly even prohibit the conduct of US
information operations. The following discussion is intended as a nonexhaustive checklist for decisionmakers faced with the question of whether to
authorize a particular information operation.
The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (LOSC)
This convention, which is currendy under review by the Senate for advice
and consent, codifies several provisions of customary international law and creates new requirements. One such provision of preexisting customary internationallaw is Article 19, which states that a vessel exercising the right ofinnocent
passage through another nation's territorial sea cannot engage in activities "prejudicial to the peace, good order, or security of the coastal State."54 Article 19
defines "prejudicial activities" to include:
• Any threat or use of force against the sovereignty, territorial integrity or
political independence of the coastal State, or in any other manner in
violation of the principles ofinternational law embodied in the Charter of
the United Nations; ...
• Any act aimed at collecting information to the prejudice of the defense or
security of the coastal State;
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• Any act of propaganda aimed at affecting the defense or security of the
coastal State; ...
• Any act aimed at interfering with any systems of communication or any
other facilities or installations of the coastal State[.]55
While the DoD/GC Paper observes that LOSC provisions "have the potential to affect only a narrow category ofinfonnation operations, "56 a literal reading of the LOSC seems to point to information operations falling under its
purview. Ship-borne infonnation weapons could be classified as "prejudicial to
the peace, good order or security ofthe coastal State" because infonnation operations are "aimed at interfering with particular systems of communication or
other facilities or installations of the coastal State." The Convention establishes a
nation's maximum territorial sea as twelve miles from the nation's coast, significantly smaller than the 200 miles that particular nations claim. 57 Thus, an obvious remedy for any legal problems with ship-borne infonnation operations is for
ships ,vielding infonnation weapons "against" or otherwise "aimed at" a coastal
nation to stay outside of the twelve-mile limit. It should be noted that the LOSC
does not expressly address whether its obligations are enforced during an international armed conflict.

Treaties on Civil Aviation
Article 3 (d) of the 1944 Chicago Convention, which established the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO), states, "The contracting States undertake, when issuing regulations for their state aircraft, that they will have due
regard for the safety of navigation of civil aircraft."58 The DoD/GC Paper observes that, as a result, military aircraft have an obligation of" due regard" for the
safety of civil aircraft, meaning an obligation "not to interfere with the systems"
of civilian aircraft, but does not elaborate on this obligation.
A question thus arises concerning the use of infonnation warfare against
particular navigational systems or other dual-use systems, i.e., used both by
military and civilian aircraft. For example, a particular navigational satellite
might be used both by military and civilian aircraft, or a particular civilian-military airport might use the same radar for both military and civilian
flights. An infonnation operation against such computer equipment with the
aim of disrupting military operations could impact civilian aircraft as well,
leading to a violation of civil aviation treaty obligations. The DoD/GC Paper
notes that the Chicago Convention specifically provides that the treaty does
not "affect the freedom of action of any of the contracting States affected,

385

"Weapons like to Lightning"
whether as belligerents or as neutrals."59 It also notes that many provisions of
the convention are inconsistent with wartime circumstances and, therefore,
the Chicago Convention would be unlikely to survive as a complete entity in
the event of an armed conflict. However, Article 89 does not provide adequate guidance in ascertaining what provisions of the Chicago Convention
are applicable during an armed conflict and thus what limitations exist on information operations in wartime.

Treaties on Diplomatic Relations
The 1961 Vienna Convention grants to diplomatic missions the right of inviolability of the premises and its documents and communications. The convention also requires that diplomatic personnel respect the laws and
regulations of the State in which they are stationed and that "premises of the
mission must not be used in any manner incompatible with the functions of
the mission as laid down in the present Convention or by other rules of general international law or by any special agreements in force between the sending State and the receiving State."60 As the DoD/GC Paper concludes,
"Planning for any information operations activity that involves diplomatic
premises, persons, archives, documents, or communications, either as an instrument or as a target of the operation, must take into account these interna-tionallegal obligations."61
.

Treaties of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation (FCN)
These bilateral agreements between the United States and other nations establish arrangements for tourism, trade, transportation, and other routine and
practical issues. According to the DoD/GC Paper, such treaties probably would
be suspended in the event of armed conflict. However, to the extent that information operations are utilized in peace-time, decisionmakers must take into account obligations incurred in FCN treaties to the extent they will impact
information operations. For example, one could imagine the scenario in which
the targeted nation will attribute the information operation to criminal elements
or to economic espionage and will request assistance from the United States under the FCN treaty (or under mutual legal assistance agreements and extradition
agreements)in response to such information operations. US officials need to be
prepared to respond to such a request even when the information operation is a
military or intelligence operation.
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Status of Forces Agreements and Foreign Domestic Law
Stationing agreements and defense cooperation agreements memorialize the
consent ofthe host nation to the presence ofUS troops, set limits on troop numbers, and identify facilities. The United States also commonly enters into status
of forces agreements (SOFAs) to address legal jurisdiction over its forces. The
DoD/GC Paper notes that, by the end of1998, the United States was a party to
103 SOFAs. Many require that the US notify the host nation of any significant
change regarding the capabilities or status of the military forces stationed in the
host country.
As the DoD/GC Paper states, if authorities intend to conduct infonnation
operations from US bases abroad, a determination must be made as to whether
the relevant agreements require notifying the host nation and perhaps even requesting its consent. 62 The paper also notes that such agreements often require
that US equipment not interfere with the host nation's communication system
and that such equipment cannot violate the host nation's laws and regulations.
Host nations may understandably be concerned about infonnation weapons
criss-crossing their telecommunications equipment for fear ofpossible, unintentional infection of the host nation's computers. They might also be wary of the
counter-measures or acts ofself-defense by the target nation ofa US infonnation
operation. Yet, even ifa host nation opposed the use of US forces stationed in its
country to conduct infonnation operations, the difficulty ofattributing an information operation to its true source might give US forces sufficient cover regarding the origin of the attack, and thus might assuage the host nation's concern
regarding its own possible vulnerability to counter-measures or reprisals.
It should be noted that foreign domestic laws impact the conduct of US defensive infonnation operations because foreign law enforcement officials may
not be authorized to conduct criminal investigations ofpossible computer crime
or infonnation warfare unless the conduct at issue constitutes a crime according
to the laws of that particular country. As a result, officials may not receive the expected levels of cooperation from foreign law enforcement officials in the investigation of an apparendy criminal information operation emanating from a
particular country. Conversely, ifa foreign government does oudaw activity that
constitutes infonnation warfare, US military officials may decide to refrain from
offensively-oriented infonnation operations conducted from their bases in that
particular country in order not to subject US forces to liability or culpability for
violating that foreign country's laws. Furthennore, even if US forces would not
be liable or culpable legally, commanders may wish to avoid the appearance of
violating foreign domestic law.63 As the DoD/GC Paper notes, conduct by
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military personnel that constitutes an offense under the host nation's law and not
under US law could give the host nation exclusive jurisdiction to prosecute. This
situation could occur ifa host nation's computer law is more developed than US
law or prohibits particular forms of information warfaie. 64 Of course, the flexibility and interconnectedness of the Internet mean that the United States could
conduct the information operations from a host country that allows such operations, thus avoiding the particular countries that criminalize such activity.65
Espionage
The DoD / GC Paper emphasizes the fact that, given the ambiguity surrounding the concept ofinformation warfare, the division between espionage and the
use offorce is ambiguous. Thus, it may be unclear whether an information operation constitutes espionage or a military attack-or both. The paper also notes
that the division oflabor between the intelligence community and the military
concerning covert action is likely to be blurred by information operations. As it
concludes, "it remains to be seen how information operations activities will fall
within this division oflabor," especially when such information operations occur in the conte:ll..1: of military operations other than war such as peacekeeping,
peace-enforcement, and counter-narcotics rnissions. 66

An Information Warfare Treaty?
In October 1998, Russia introduced a resolution in the United Nation's First
Committee calling for States to report their views concerning the "advisability of
elaborating international legal regimes to ban the development, production and
use ofparticularly dangerous information weapons." The United States responded that it was premature to discuss negotiating an international treaty concerning
information warfare. On the one hand, an international treaty serves the interest of
less-technologically developed nations because the treaty would most likely restrict more advanced nations such as the United States from developing information warfare techniques. On the other hand, an international treaty need not
necessarily set restrictions below the level at which advanced nations currendy operate. Such restrictions would be equivalent to arms-control agreements setting a
limit on number of weapons well-above the number of weapons actually possessed by signatory States. Furthermore, a treaty limiting information operations
by nations does not address the problem of terrorists or hackers. 67
A treaty could potentially ban information operations but allow research on
information warfare or limit research to defensive capabilities. However, the
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distinction between offensive and defensive infonnation warfare might blur because an understanding ofoffensive operations is required for construction ofeffective defenses (and vice versa).68 Alternatively, a treaty could conceivably
require certain identifYing marks on military infonnation operations so that
countries can identify the source ofoperations, although the lack ofsuch attribution characteristics might be a violation of the current law of war concerning
perfidy-meaning that a new treaty is not required for this specific purpose. It
should also be noted that, as a nation advances technologically, it becomes more
vulnerable to technological attack; in other words, the United States could actually benefit from an international treaty due to its economy's heavy reliance on
computer infrastructure. This assumes, however, that the treaty is both ,videly
adopted and enforceable. Also, the treaty should not leave the United States
powerless to defend itself against attacks from terrorists or hackers as opposed to
information operations launched by another State.
The DoD/GC Paper concludes that "[t]here seems to be no particularly good
reason for the United States to support negotiations for new treaty obligations
and most of the areas of international law that are direcdy relevant to infonnation operations. "69 It nevertheless observes that one area in which international
agreements would be beneficial is cooperation concerning criminal law, namely
efforts to raise the level of foreign countries' criminal laws concerning computer
crimes to that recognized by the United States. Although the" DoD/GC Paper
states that it is unclear how such a treaty could actually work in practice, it also
speculates that a treaty concerning information terrorism might be useful.

Conclusion
The DoD/GC Paper states that there are no "show-stoppers" in international
law prohibiting US information operations.7o However, obligations concerning
the use of outer space may present problems ifa particular information operation
qualifies as a "weapon ofmass destruction." Furthennore, other obligations under
international law present complications-and opportunities-for the conduct of
US infonnation operations. Decisionmakers must be sure to assess the impact of
international law on each proposed information operation.
Notes
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